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Abstract
2

Networked control systems, NCS, consist of smart nodes: sensors, actuators, and controllers. The
use of such smart nodes is essential in smart factories to be able to with deal with Industry 4.0.
NCS are widely implemented in lots of critical industrial applications. A main advantage of NCS
is the abundant bandwidth. This research presents NCS that utilizes switched Ethernet with 16
sensing nodes, 4 actuation nodes & a smart controller. The model also consists of a smart sensor
that has an embedded video controller and its actuator. The smart sensor processes the video
captured by the onboard camera and the entrenched controller. The study added fault tolerant on
the system where the sensor‘s embedded controller acted as a spare controller to the system‘s
main and a performability analysis was studied. This system was simulated on Riverbed and
various scenarios were tested in the presence and absence of noise. Simulations clearly indicated
zero packet loss and no over-delayed packets. The noise in this research was an FTP file being
exchanged between the noise node and the main controller. Later in the research, a modification
on the system was done and an FPGA was utilized in the system. Making use of its Dynamic
Partial Reconfiguration feature where some failures are being repaired without system
interruption. In addition to DPR, FPGAs are powerful chips and are used progressively in
industry. The modified model includes image storing feature and fault tolerant methods to
increase the system‘s reliability and lifetime. In addition to the mentioned features, the new
system guarantees less traffic on the network in all cases in comparison to the previous model.
Markov Models were developed for both systems and simulated using SHARPE package. A case
study was presented to compare both systems in terms of reliability; results indicated that the
modified system is more reliable.

XI

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background

Figure 1.1 Industrial Revolution [1]

Over the years the industry has evolved. The introduction of water and steam-powered
mechanical production is considered the first industrial revolution facilities in the late 1700s.
Second, came the introduction of the electricity- powered assembly line that facilitated the mass
production of many products. The development of PLCs in late 1960s initiated the third
industrial revolution since, it enabled production automation. The massive development that is
being currently in action is considered the latest industrial revolution, in other words; Industry
4.0.
Industry 4.0 transforms the previous-style manufacturing into smart manufacturing and
forms the basis of the future smart factories as they grow more automated and intelligent [2].
Likewise, in industrial networks technologies such as fieldbus and Wireless Sensor Networks
1

(WSN) proved their importance [3]. This is due to the importance of the network layer in
monitoring and controlling the smart factory. The main physical resources of smart
manufacturing resources are the reprogrammable industrial units, reprogrammable manufacture
lines and smart data acquisition units [3]
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) consists of networked smart controllers transmitting
data with smart sensors and actuators. Small frequent control packets are being communicated
over the network. The traffic is sent to the controllers from the sensors. Controllers then, transmit
the required action to the actuation nodes [4]. NCS decreases the system‘s complexity and allows
sharing of data since, the data is always accessible on the network. Thus, NCS can be of a vital
role in factory automation. The addition of Fault Tolerance techniques to NCSs is important in
increasing the system‘s reliability and/or performability. Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs) are being currently used in numerous industrial control applications due to its
flexibility and ability to recover impermanent errors resulted from the surroundings.

1.2 Contribution of this Thesis
This thesis studies a distributed NCS, composed of smart sensing nodes along with smart
actuation nodes and smart controllers. At the controller level, fault-tolerance is applied. Network
performance is assessed according to the end-to-end delays. The suggested model is
demonstrated and tested via Riverbed Network Modeler [5], both in the fault-free scenario and
the fault-tolerant scenarios. The system performance is also assessed in the existence and
absence of a noise node that adds non-control traffic to the network. Then, a Performability
analysis is presented and applied with a delay-based reward.
Modifications were then made to the previously presented architecture in order to solve
the two issues. First, the video data is communicated on the network once the embedded video
controller fails; which results in network congestion and is anticipated to cause an increase in the
end to end delay particularly upon the increase in the frame size. Second thing is the storage
issue; the captured video data cannot be retrieved later as, there was no storage node which can
store this information. Since, some applications might entail saving the sensed images and
transmitting them over the network every now and then to the supervisor for backup. Thus, the
2

key change is the addition of an FPGA and removing the entrenched video controller. The use of
FPGA caused some additional cost. An Embedded dual core ARM processor is included in the
FPGA chip. Fault Tolerance will be applied to the FPGA in to increase the system‘s reliability.
A comparison between both systems will be presented. The used of an FPGA will solve the
storage issue. It should be mentioned that this research is concerned with the failure of each
block in the FPGA (as in [6]) and not the total chip failure.

1.3 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 includes the literature review in which it explains the concept of NCS in terms
of functionality, advantages and applications. It also presents the architecture and the application
of the previously presented NCS works. Then, the chapter explains some fault tolerant
techniques used for NCS. It also presents the different methods that can be used to assess the
fault tolerant technique used. Later in this chapter, previously used fault tolerance systems for
NCS are shown. Finally, Field Programmable gate arrays are discussed in detail: operation,
advantages and examples from the literature.
Chapter 3 presents the architecture of the proposed fault tolerant NCS with video sensors
model. The system is explained in detail in terms of the sampling period, control packets,
protocol and video used. The fault tolerant technique used in the proposed model was described.
Then, the performability analysis explicated. Simulations done on the systems to assess the
functionality and performability were also clarified. At last, the simulation results are presented.
Chapter 4 presents the modified architecture of the previously mentioned model in the
earlier chapter. The modified model uses an FPGA. The fault tolerant technique used in this
improved model is presented and the system reliability is computed. In addition, a comparison
between both systems is carried and shown in a case study.
Lastly, the work is concluded in chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Networked Control Systems (NCS)
2.1.1 Introduction

Figure 2.1 NCS

NCS is composed of smart sensing nodes and actuation nodes communicating with smart
networked controllers. Sensed data is transmitted to controller every sampling period. The
controller is in charge of processing the data, taking control decisions & transmitting the actions
to the actuators as shown in Fig.2.1. It should be noted that the controls deadlines are met in the
worst delay conditions. There are various industrial applications that uses NCS.
NCS are either event-triggered or time-triggered this is determined according to the
availability of the clock signal [7]. In Time-triggered systems, samples are taken at discrete time
with constant sampling period. On the other hand, in Event-triggered systems actions are taken
when a certain event takes place while the sampling is continuous. NCS can be used in lots of
real time and non-real time control applications.
Smart sensors/ sensing nodes are characterized by the capability to sense certain property
such as motion, temperature, pressure and lots of others, and communicate with other nodes. In
other words, it is responsible for data acquisition and communication. Intelligence in sensors
4

makes them capable for functioning independently. Sensed data can be locally processed. In
some cases, depending on the application requirements, they are able to apply self- calibration/
diagnosis. In addition, sensors correctly encode the output before communicating the data on the
network [8] [9].
On the other hand, smart actuators play the same role as the smart sensors, but in the
opposite way. To illustrate, they are in charge of decoding and post-processing of data if needed
within the actuation node before applying the necessary action to the physical system [8].
Networked controllers are in charge of generating control commands and transmitting it
to the actuators after processing the receiving the sensed data [8]. The control algorithm handles
both centralized and decentralized information analysis. In a distributed, decentralized NCS, the
control is divided among the nodes: smart sensing nodes, controllers and the smart actuation
nodes. The network should always guarantee that delays are within the limits. Another important
use of the controller nodes is the possibility of supporting human-machine interface to either
operators or higher-level managers [8].

2.1.2 Advantages of NCS [10]
1. Flexibility; allows network extension and sharing.
2. Reduced Complexity
3. Data Sharing; data is available on the network nodes when needed.
4. Elimination of unnecessary wiring to build the large control system.
5. Extendibility; it is possible to add sub control systems and extend the network to be
connected to the central control system without massive changes to the physical layout
of the system.
6. Remotely controlled

5

2.1.3 Protocols
Fieldbus or in other words, the real-time industrial network, is a central component for
building automated industrial structures. Protocols should be more intelligent and flexible.
Accordingly, to be able to meet the real-time necessities and restrictions required by NCS
devices, various standard organizations and retailers have developed several fieldbus protocols.
Protocols such as: WorldFIP, Profibus and Foundation Fieldbus, are declared as global
standard and are widely used over Ethernet because of their deterministic characteristics.
However, these protocols are limited in throughput. Besides the business market for such
protocols is limited for the following reasons. First, these protocols are specific to applications.
Second, for applications that require higher quality information it is hard to upgrade due to the
high price of hardware and complexity of interfacing with different vendors products. EtherCAT
is a protocol that provides high real-time performance; the master is implemented with standard
components while the slave requires special hardware to maintain the short packet forwarding
delays in the devices. ModBus TCP is a protocol that supports the communication between smart
devices on serial line, TCP was used for the data transport and is compatible with other Ethernet
products. Profinet is the successor of Profibus, it offers real time support and allows the
integration of fieldbuses. Ethernet is more convenient, available off shelf and cheaper along with
it gives high speeds that is expected to increase even more by time. Hence, Ethernet is used in
the industrial automation area after enhancing the predictability by applying some modifications.

Ethernet
More than 40 years ago in the early 1970s at Xerox, Ethernet was developed by Metcalfe
to connect a PC to a laser printer. The IEEE 802.3. standardized the Ethernet but some minor
differences to the original format. 2.94Mbps was the starting transmission rate for the protocol
till it reached the current speed of 1Gbps and 10Gbps and is expected to increase. Throughout
the years and by use of hubs and unshielded twisted pair cables, the physical medium changed
from a thick coaxial cable bus to a star topology [11].
Since Ethernet is fast and easy to install with low-priced ICs‘ interfaces, nowadays
Ethernet is best solution for local area networks at homes and offices. Consequently, due to that
6

wide-spread usage, Ethernet interfaces are being installed in almost all electronic equipment
[12]. The Ethernet was originally invented for local usage as mentioned before, currently it‘s
being proposed and implemented in industrial applications [11] [12].
The MAC for Ethernet is CSMA/CD and is illustrated in Fig.2.2. For a frame to be
transmitted, transmission medium should be checked whether it is busy or not by the source
station. The source denies transmission and pauses till the medium converts idle, if the medium
is jammed. Else if the medium is idle, the source sends the frame. A jam signal is sent to alert an
incidence of the collision to other stations when a collision is perceived during the transmission
and the source interposes the transmission and broadcasts. After collision, a backoff time is
paused depending on the truncated binary exponential backoff (BEB) algorithm and then
resends. This retry can be done not more than 16 times, after that the transmission is inhibited.
CSMA/CD algorithm causes the communication delay to be comparably high under heavy traffic
due to frequent collisions. The network throughput can decrease significantly due to discarding
the frames after 16 unsuccessful transmission attempts this happens in extreme cases [13].

7

Figure 2.2 Transmission Procedure of CSMA/CD [13]

An example will be explained to further clarify the non-determinism issue in Ethernet.
Assume a message is to be transmitted by two stations, while the medium is busy being used by
a third station to transmit its message. Once the third station has finished transmitting, only one
of the two awaiting stations will be able to successfully transmit its message. Knowing in
advance which of the two stations is transmitting its message first is impossible. Hence, an upper
bound to the time needed to send a message from one node to the other cannot be specified. The
only option is to evaluate the probability that this time will not surpass a certain value. This
randomness in time determination was not accepted because real-time guarantees were needed
by the users. [12].
8

Some of the main industrial communications features are: Time-deterministic
communication, Exchange of very small data record in a frequent and efficient manner, and
Timely synchronization of actions between the field devices [14]. Since industrial applications
are Real-time based, it requires the mentioned features. Consequently, some modifications have
been made to Ethernet to achieve the required behaviour. Below are few examples:
1. Modifications in MAC
In this approach, changes are applied in the MAC layer. By this access time to the bus
is limited. For instance, a categorized priority of nodes can be set. Thus, if a collision
takes place, the nodes with the lowest priority automatically stop competing for the
bus unlike the nodes with the higher priority. These nodes will keep sending till a
successful transmission happens. There are two main downsides in this approach.
First, is that changes have to be applied to the firmware increasing the cost of
Ethernet and losing one of its core advantages. Second, the maximum transmission
time can be a lot higher than the regular transmission time and this a major
disadvantage, as transmission time is one of the crucial elements to real-time
applications. Hence, such approach isn‘t widely spread [11].
2. Adding transmission control over Ethernet:
In this methodology, an extra layer is implemented on top of Ethernet as an approach
to accomplish real-time-constrained applications over Ethernet. The responsibility of
this layer is to control message transmissions timing. By this, either an upper bound
of the number of collisions is achieved or the collisions are prevented altogether. The
advantage of using this approach instead of the modified the MAC layer method is
that the hardware doesn‘t change. Consequently, the standard Ethernet hardware can
be used that is of low cost. Master/Slave, Token-Passing, TDMA are some of the
methodologies that can be done to achieve this control over Ethernet, and each of
which has its pros and cons [11].

9

3. Traffic Shaping:

Figure 2.3 An example of traffic shaping into three traffic priorities

In this solution, the main concern is to reduce the probability of collision by reducing
the bus utilization. Yet, this is just reducing the number of collisions and not
eliminating it. Thus, a given probability of collisions on the bus can be concluded, if
the traffic on the bus is set below a certain threshold and bursts of traffic are
prevented. As a try to attain this, for example, traffic smoother, an interface layer, is
employed between the Ethernet layer and the transport layer (TCP or UDP). As
previously discussed, Real-time traffic is event-triggered; hence, it is communicated
on demand and spread on the time domain. Unlike non-real-time traffic, it is
supposedly transmitted in bursts and is handled by the traffic smoother. The function
of the smoother is to track the previous transmissions of messages executed by the
node. Knowing the transmission history of the node and according to its assigned
transmission rate, the non-real-time traffic is transmitted in a controlled manner.
Therefore, at the node level, the transmission of real-time messages gets a higher
priority in comparison to the transmission of non-real-time messages. At the network
level, a probabilistic bound is set to the interference due to non-real-time traffic [11].

10

4. Switched Ethernet

Figure 2.4 Comparison of transmission methods of Ethernet and switched
Ethernet [13].

The switched Ethernet is the promising industrial fieldbus protocol that is different
than the conventional Ethernet in several features. The first change is in operation
mode of the hub in which all the nodes are connected. The hub is a passive device as
shown in Fig.2.3a. It repeats the received data from the input port to all output ports
in other words, it acts as a broadcaster. Unlike in the Switched Ethernet, the hub is an
active device which recognizes and transmits the frame only to the destination as
presented in Fig. 2.3b. Consequently, frames‘ collision can be avoided if destinations
of the transmitting multiple stations are different. The second change is the
connection type between a station and the hub. The switched Ethernet uses a fullduplex link; the station can transmit and receive frames simultaneously, while the
conventional Ethernet uses a half-duplex link. This allows a node to send and accept
frames simultaneously. Thus, because of the two major changes, the switch ethernet
can be considered free of collisions [13].
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2.1.4 Previous works on NCS
Many control applications work at relatively low speeds in comparison to the speeds of
the new network standards. Without handling the control packets in a special manner, the
required delays of these packets can be obtained under realistic loading conditions. Various
control applications run at relatively lower speeds in comparison to the that of the new network
standards. Without handling the control packets in a special manner, logical loading conditions
could be the reason for reaching the required delays of these packets. In [9], two models were
modeled to study whether systems that fail with Fast Ethernet switches can work properly with
Gigabit Ethernet. For the sake of performance comparison, one model is simulated on-top-of
Fast Ethernet and the other one is simulated over Gigabit Ethernet. The light traffic system
model is represented by 16 sensing nodes, one controlling element and 4 actuation nodes; this is
based on the model implemented in [15]. One the other hand the heavy traffic model entails 48
sensing nodes, one controlling element and 4 actuation nodes. The results of this study validate
the concepts that while using high speed Ethernet networks, standard switches accommodate the
timing requirements of several control systems. Simulations presented that if this traffic is within
practical limits, the control packets will not be affected in the case of additional traffic resulting
from integration of other functions. It may require to be limited at the upper layer software
instead of at the switch itself in order to possess the non-real-time traffic within practical limits.

In [16], the study was focused on light traffic NCS where the network consisted of 16
sensing nodes, one controlling element and 4 actuation nodes connected in star Ethernet. The
machine is adjusted to run at one revolution per second for 60 strokes per minute. The sampling
frequency was adjusted to be 1440 Hz. Consequently, 28,800 packets are being processed per
second. This is equal to multiplying the count of actuation nodes and sensing nodes by the
sampling frequency. Adding non-real-time traffic of: FTP, HTTP, telnet and e-mail check was
the applications used to simulate the operator intervention on the machine. In case of two
machines operating with one controller, it is advised to block non real time traffic. The blockage
is done by discontinuing the FTP access at the application layer under this serious operation. At
last, the study concluded that when applying the heavy composite load (real-time and non-realtime) to the simulated networks neither Ethernet speeds can tolerate. Alternatively, Fast Ethernet
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failed to accommodate the real-time traffic and to send packets within the restricted time frame
unlike the Gigabit Ethernet that successfully did.

2.2 Fault tolerance
The basic definition for fault tolerance is the proper and correct system operation in the
presence of fault [17]. The importance of fault tolerance is crucial in safety applications to avoid
problems. Nowadays, systems became more complex and as the complexity of the system
increases, the reliability decreases. In addition, faults can occur for any reason even if the system
was tested several times and the hardware were checked and correctly operating. Therefore, the
necessity of fault tolerant system increased. This is because fault tolerant systems ensure the
correct operation of the system even with some faulty parts. An important aspect in fault tolerant
system is dependability where the system is able to perform its planned level of performance
[17].
All forms of Performability: Steady State, Cumulative and Transient Performability (SSP,
CP and TP respectively) can be analyzed [18]. Reliability Modeling is one of the various
techniques that can quantify the increase in system‘s reliability. Basically, the probability that the
system functions without failure in the interval [0, t], given that the system is working correctly
at time (t = 0), is known as Reliability R (t). In other words, Reliability represents the probability
of success and varies with time.
The Failure rate, λ, of any system is the expected number of failures per unit time. The
below curve, Bathtub curve in Fig. 2.2, presents the typical failure rate evolution of a system
over its lifetime.
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Figure 2.5: Bathtub curve; failure rate evolution of a system [17]

The curve is divided into 3 main phases: infant mortality, useful life and wear out. To
start with, the infant mortality phase is when the system is at the start of its life cycle. In this
phase, λ sharply decreases because of the weak components‘ failures. As for the useful lifetime
phase, λ stabilizes and remains constant. In the last phase, the components begin to damage;
increasing the failure rate.
In the useful lifetime phase, the system‘s reliability decreases exponentially with time
since the failure rate is constant; exponential failure law.
(1)
The below Fig. 2.3 demonstrates the law.

Figure 2.6: Exponential failure rate [17]
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To determine the dependability of fault tolerant systems the following procedures are
usedsuch as Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) and Mean time
between Failures (MTBF).
MTTF is the expected time of the occurrence of the first system failure.
(2)
MTTR is the average time required to repair the system.
(3)
MTBF is the average time between failures of the system and is equal the sum of MTTF and
MTTR if the repair makes the system perfect.
(4)
Fault tolerant controls (FTCs) or in other words the fault tolerance techniques added to
NCS is of crucial importance. FTCs can automatically get over components‘ failure. One of the
widely used FT techniques to NCSs is Modular redundancy. This redundancy technique
improves the failure rate; in case of the combined component it is applied. An important
advantage of Fault tolerance is the prevention of fault propagation throughout the system. Failure
rate enhancements along with fault propagation prevention are critical for NCS applications
especially safety-critical ones such as: aerospace, automotive, manufacturing and other process
industries [19]. The increased safety and reliability of FTC systems resulted in wider range of
applications that require implementation.
One of the most commonly encountered and widely implemented fault tolerance
techniques in NCS is, Modular redundancy. It can be applied to any component in the system
sensor, actuator and/or controller. Also, it can be applied on the network level. Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) and Sift-Out Modular Redundancy are most popular techniques.
Although Fault detection techniques don't prevent or tolerate the error, it alerts the system
when there is a faulty result. On the other hand, fault masking adds redundancy for fault
tolerance. It either isolates the faulty results or isolate/prevent them from reaching the output of
15

the module. This technique isn‘t dynamic, as element stays there with no actual intervention.
Hence, once the masking redundancy is drained then the error will reach out output [20].
The difference between failure, fault and error should be highlighted. Failure indicates a
physical break where the output is always wrong. As for fault, it is the mathematical model that
described the physical break. Error is basically an incorrect piece of information.

2.3 Previous work on Fault tolerance in NCS
In [21], the proposed model is basically a grouping of the S2A architecture that is
described in [22] and the In-Loop architecture that is detailed in [4] connected through an
Ethernet switch. The S2A is implemented for video sensor network application on the same
FPGA board where the controller is embedded in the sensor node. The In-Loop architecture
contains sensing nodes, controller and actuation nodes. the simulation setting is set to be very
harsh with high probability of impermanent failures in FPGAs. This model requires high
reliability as video sensors are very sensitive with rapidly changing input data. Both Hot standby
[23] and Sift-Out which is based on organizing the system into L identical modules [24] fault
tolerant techniques were investigated. The Single Event Upsets fault model was used and the
Dynamic Partial Recovery (DPR) was used for repossession. Reliability is then calculated after
applying each fault tolerant method. It was shown that the amount of redundancy in the Sift-Out
technique is much more than that implemented in Hot Standby. Thus, it is predicted to cause a
more reliable yet more expensive system [20]. Markov Models were implemented for reliability
calculations.
In [25], two and three-cell systems were studied. Each cell system contained sensing
nodes, actuation nodes and a controller. Sensors transmit their data to an access point that is
connected to a controller. The controller‘s reply is sent to actuators through a similar link. All
sensors send their data to all the controllers. Packet delay varies according to the number of
operational controllers. The robustness of the system is dependent on the difference between the
measured packet delay and the 16ms benchmark; In other words, the higher the difference, the
more robust the system will be. In the case of controller failure regardless the count, the
operating controllers take over the load. The network can accommodate with only one functional
controller. Fault-tolerance is conducted in the presence and absence of noise. The noise was
16

addede from neighboring ISM channels. At the end, a Performability analysis of the system was
studied and another reward was assigned.

2.4 FPGAs
FPGAs are pre-fabricated silicon devices. They are considered a type of integrated
circuits that are used to apply any digital circuit or system. Several applications in the fields of
data processing, networks, industrial, space and automotive can be implemented using FPGAs.
In addition, they are used in various industrial control applications such as FPGA-based speed
controllers [26] and FPGA-based motor controllers [27].

2.4.1 FPGAs Architecture
FPGAs are composed of programmable interconnections connecting the Configurable
Logic Blocks (CLBs) as shown in Fig.2.4 [28]. They also consist of programmable input/output
(I/O) ports to allow communication with the surroundings via various peripherals [29]. In other
words, the basic cells along with the interconnections are completely programable by the
designer/ end user. Thus, it allows building the required hardware architecture according to the
application requirements [30]. Look Up Table (LUT), Multiplexers and Sequential elements are
the three main components of CLBs. LUT is the main block in the FPGA. It is responsible for
implementing the combinational logic by mapping it to the truth table via the SRAM
configuration cells in the FPGA. Multiplexers are used to determine the signals connections in
the CLB. As for the Sequential elements, they are important for the digital logic design.
Sequential elements can be either latch or flip-flop and be edge or level sensitive.
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Figure 2.7 FPGA Architecture [28]

2.4.2 Partial Reconfiguration
It should be noted that the logic in FPGAs are divided in to two parts: static and
reconfigurable presented in Fig. 2.4 as grey and black respectively. FPGAs can be considered as
flexible devices since it can be programmed or re-programmed without the need of refabrication.

This ability is known as Partial Re-configuration in which the modification takes

place in the Internal Configuration Access Point (ICAP); while the FPGA is operating, a bit file
known as partial configuration file is loaded without affecting the static part of the design [31].
As shown in Fig. 2.8, in order to modify the function implemented on Block ―A‖, one of the
multiple bit files (A4.bit, A3.bit, A2.bit & A1.bit) available must be downloaded.
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Figure 2.8 Partial Reconfiguration [31]

2.4.3 Types of Faults in FPGAs
There are two forms of faults that take place in FPGAs: transient and permanent.
The complete damage of the semiconductors is known as the permanent fault. The
reparation of this fault happens only when the faulty hardware is replaced or repaired. The main
cause of this fault is due to either degradation phenomena, manufacturing defects or
electromagnetic waves/ radiation.
Negative-Bias Temperature Instability, Hot-carrier effect, Electro migration and TimeDependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) are the types of degradation phenomenon. Hot-carrier
effect causes a stuck of charges in the gate channel interface region. This results in reducing the
channel mobility gradually and increasing the threshold voltage in CMOS transistors [32]. As for
the Negative-Bias Temperature Instability, the switching speed becomes slower causing delay
faults and trapped charges as in the case of hot-carrier effect [33].
On the other hand, Electromigration is a process where the metal ions migrate over time
consequently, voids and deposits in FPGA interconnects are created. This results in open and
short circuits causing faults [34]. Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) degradation
affects the transistors‘ gates resulting in an increase in the leakage current which causes a short
circuit. The mentioned mechanism causes charge traps within the gate [35]. Concerning the
manufacturing defects, it is the type of fault where the circuit nodes are stuck at 0 or 1 or, switch
too slow that it can‘t meet the timing specification. FPGA interconnect network can be affected
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by the defects, since it can result in short or open faults in the circuits and stuck open or closed
pass transistors [36].
Electromagnetic waves/ radiation can be considered the most common cause for inducing
the fault. There are different types of faults due to the mentioned reason. Single Event Effects
(SEE) occurs when the radiation hits the silicone of the FPGA causing either permanent or
transient fault depending on the amount of charge [37].
Permanent faults result from SEE includes Single Event Latch up (SEL) which is an
abnormal high-current state in the FPGA resulted from the flow of a single energetic particle
through sensitive regions of the device structure and causing the loss of device functionality.
SEL might cause permanent failure to the device. However, if the device is not permanently
damaged, power cycling of the device is required to restore normal operation.
Transient faults are basically the ones where recovery is applicable by programming the
correct bits. There are several types of transient faults resulted from SEE such as: Single Event
Upsets (SEUs), Multiple Bit Upset (MBU), Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI), Single
Event Transient (SET), Address decoding fault and Coupling fault. SEU is the most common
one, where an SRAM cell in the configuration memory is being flipped from a ‗0‘ to ‗1‘ or vice
versa, causing wrong functionality of the FPGA. The fault is corrected when the memory is reconfigured with correct bits. The difference between SEU & MBU is that in the MBU, the fault
occurs in several adjacent configuration bits. Regarding SEFI, the fault occurs when SEUs
happens in the configuration RAM of the active region of an FPGA [38]. As for SET, this fault is
due to induced voltage pulses on a combinatorial circuit in a device from the impacting ions.
Invalid data values can be transmitted via the circuit, if the induced voltage level increases above
the switching level threshold and the pulse-width is enough.
Concerning Address decoding fault, it is due to any fault affecting the address decoding
causing address mismatches. On the other hand, coupling fault is the fault where a write
operation to a cell changes the content of another cell.

20

2.5 Previous work on Fault tolerance on FPGAs
In [39], FPGAs were used and the fault tolerance and modular redundancy concepts were
illustrated. In this study a fault secure FPGA-based TMR voter was developed. Since FPGA has
lots of properties and advantages, a TMR voter employed on the FPGA is no longer taken as a
single point of failure in the TMR modular redundancy solution. The TMR voter is executed on
FPGA using Truth Table (TT) that applies alternating logic and is connected to a multiplexer.
After that, the multiplexer is connected to a Flip-Flop (FF) which saves the voter‘s output in
order to be used by the rest of the system. It should be noted that, SEUs and SETs where used to
represent transient faults while the stuck-at-0(1) represents permanent faults.
The TT data is controlled by the bits in the configuration memory of the FPGA. Hence, if
a SEU occurs in the TT, it will directly affect the configuration memory and consequently, x the
TMR voter‘s functionality will be affected. Thus, [39] proposes using the direct access of the
ICAP to the configuration memory of the FPGA along with its ability to read and write data.
Furthermore, it was shown that the wrong outputs produced from the TMR voter can be avoided
by using alternating logic and the ICAP.
By masking the incorrect module‘s output, the fault-secure TMR voter prevents the
whole system from producing an erroneous output. However, it also indicates the faulty
module‘s address which caused a different output. This is attained by two additional output links
namely A0 and A1 that carry the address of the faulty module, as shown in figure 2.9, as
presented in [39].

Figure 2.9 Fault Secure TMR voter Architecture
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In addition, to detect faults in the multiplexer and the FF, the technique of alternating
logic is used. This method is used for fault discovery in a digital circuit and can be easily applied
to self-dual functions. Self-dual functions satisfy the property of
any logical function, , into a self-dual one,
, where

or converting

by adding an extra input, , so that

, is the dual of the original function . The application of alternating logic is done

by sending the data at

after that send its complement at

. By this, a fault can be detected

when the two sets of received data are not complements. [39] implemented this circuit and is
shown in Fig. 2.10.

MUX

Figure 2.10 Implementation of majority function voter on FPGAs [39]

If a fault occurs in any of the voter components, alternating logic will be used for fault
detection. Although, the recovery will be different, according to the type of fault that took place.
If the fault is an SEU or MEU which occurs in the configuration memory of the FPGA, the ICAP
will handle since it can read and write the voter‘s configuration data. After reading the voter‘s
configuration data by the ICAP, it compares them with a hardwired previous copy that is
suggested to be located inside the FPGA. Whenever a bit is found to be different, the ICAP
overwrites the configuration bits using DPR. However, if a permanent fault occurs, the voter‘s
circuitry is reconfigured all over again, using DPR, on another segment on the FPGA [39].
In [40], a Fault-Tolerant FPGA-based S2A controller is modeled that consists of a small
processor, memory and related hardware. Fault-Tolerant methods are implemented to the model.
By this the single points of failure are eliminated even in recovery approaches. The method used
for recovery is DPR. The fault model used is single and/or some multiple events upset. The
system showed an enhanced reliability in the case study.

In [41], a new scheme is proposed that dynamically selects the suitable Fault Tolerance
method which can be autonomously implemented to all system‘s components. In this model,
22

there is a compromise between increasing reliability of the system and overriding the minimum
amount of battery power according to the application requirements. Choosing the suitable FT
technique depends on numerous changing factors throughout the mission time. These factors are:
Battery level, module power consumption, failure type either SEU only, or SEU & MEU,
module criticality at any time instant and module MTTF.

In [6], the FPGA-based controller (K) in the S2A model can be recovered from both
transient and permanent faults. A spare location is added which is partially reconfigurable. This
location is linked to the voter with the three duplicates of the controller (K). Whenever a
permanent fault occurs in any of the modules, a new copy of the module is downloaded by the
network to the spare location. Consequently, the system returns to TMR operation using two of
the original system modules and the recently downloaded one in the partially reconfigurable
location.

In [42], the FPGA is composed of: logic, interconnection and recovery part. Whenever a
permanent fault occurs in a logic part, it is relocated in a recovery part. Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) is as the FT techniques in FPGAs. If any fault occurs in one of the modules,
other modules can cover the fault.

In Chapter 3, a detailed description of the model is presented along with the Riverbed
simulations, results and performability analysis.
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Chapter 3
Performability of Fault-Tolerant NCSs with Video
Sensors
3.1 Proposed Model

Video
controller

Figure 3.1 General model

The proposed model, as displayed in Fig.3.1, consists of 16 sensors/ sensing nodes, 4
actuators/ actuation nodes and their controller in addition to a video sensor with an embedded
controller and video actuator. A 100B packet of control data is being sent by the 16 sensors;
each sends every 694 µsec to the controller (K) and at the same time to the embedded video
controller (KV). The reason for sending the exact data to both controllers is in case K fails it acts
as a backup. UDP is the protocol used instead of TCP to dodge the congestion resulted from
acknowledgments. After that, the controller transmits its produced control decision to the
actuators after being processed. Simultaneously, every 1 sec the video sensor (SV) transmits the
video data through the embedded video controller (KV) to the video actuator (AV). The model
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has two watchdog timers; each sends 1B at half the sampling period to avoid network
overloading and to ensure that each controller recognizes the changes before the processing of
the coming packet. KV sends a watchdog signal to K every 0.5sec that is half the sampling
period. Also, K exchanges a watchdog signal to the KV every 347µsec which is half the
sampling period.
Since the proposed model is a real-time control system, it should abide by certain
constraints in terms of delay and packet loss. In other words, system should guarantee that there
are no packet drops and no over delayed packets. These constraints apply to the watchdog traffic
along with the system‘s normal control traffic from the sensor traffic, actuator traffic and
controller traffic.
Regarding the control traffic, the overall end-to-end delay for packets transmitted from
the sensors to the controller and from the controllers to the actuators should not exceed the
system‘s sampling period. On the other hand, the end-to-end delay for the watchdog traffic
should not exceed half the sampling period [43]. The reason behind this is to allow adequate time
for other controller to conquest in case any of the controllers fails. Zero packet loss should be
guaranteed for both control and watchdog traffic.
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Figure 3.2 Conveyor belt

In a factory, K is the controller that should be in charge of the drive of the conveyer belt,
while SV is the camera sensor that measures the product; bottles for instance. Then it processes
the video sensed data and respond accordingly through the embedded controller KV. The
conveyer belt should always be in continuous movement. The system can stand the failure of
either the two controllers without experiencing a problem in the production line. In the event
where KV fails, some of the video data will be discarded; hence the system will safely fail by
discarding the bottles. To elaborate, losing some video packets at the moment of KV failing
before K taking over is not a problem. The other event is when K fails; the conveyer belt will not
be affected since the sensors are already transmitting their data to KV. The scenarios were
simulated using Riverbed Modeler and will be described in the following part.
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3.2 Riverbed Simulations

Figure 3.3. Riverbed Simulation Model

Fig. 3.2 presents the Riverbed simulated model.
The three simulated parts are: Fault-free, Failure of the main controller K, and Failure of
the embedded video controller KV.
3.2.1 Fault-free Scenario
The first part was an ordinarily operating scenario where all nodes are correctly
functioning. This is when both controllers K & KV are operative. All the 16 sensors along with
the video sensor send to both controllers, K & KV. At the same time, the watchdog application is
being communicated between both controllers. Since the controllers are working therefore, they
both collect data from all the sensing nodes, and undergo the required processing and after that
transmit the needed action to the concerned actuation nodes.
The reason behind reviewing the normally operational environment is to ensure the
correct procedure while the sensors are transmitting double the number of packets, since in this
case there is an increased traffic sent over the network.
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3.2.2 Fault-tolerant Scenarios
The second part is about simulating the failure of one controller while the other controller
is taking over the full control load. Full load means that the remaining operative controller is
responsible for receiving from sensing nodes, and replying to actuation nodes of both cells [17].
Accordingly, the functioning controller would do the required actions and respond to all the
actuation nodes.
Now, the volume of traffic is much less than the traffic of the fault-free model since the
replication is no longer there and the only congestion is in the connection between the
functioning controller and its switch.
Main controller (K) failure

Figure 3.4 K failure Noiseless Model

In this case, the sixteen sensing nodes (S1 to S16) each send to the entrenched video
controller (KV). At the same time, the video sensor (SV) transmits the data to KV. In other
words, it transmits to itself since KV is entrenched in SV. After that, KV sends to the 4 actuators
(A1 to A4) and to the Video actuator (AV). Thus, the raw and control data are not being sent on
the network.
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Video Embedded controller (KV) failure

Figure 3.5 KV failure Noiseless Model

With the failure of KV, the 16 Sensors (S1 to S16) each send its data to the main
controller (K). At the same time, the Video Sensor (SV) transmits its data to K. Then, K
transmits the processed action to AV and to A1, A2, A3 and A4. In this scenario, the raw data is
communicated to the controller K once KV fails. Consequently, both raw and control data are
transmitted inside the network. The interarrival time is one second. Three cameras with different
file sizes were tested. It was important to test various file sizes and track the behavior of the
system accordingly.
According to the camera specifications, the raw data is being calculated by the below
equation. Three different cameras were simulated [44].
File size (in KB) =

(5)

where N and M are the bitmap dimensions and B is the color depth in bits.
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For the 300 KB [45] camera
N equals to 640, M equals to 480 and B equals to 8
For the 768 KB [46] Camera
N equals to 1024, M equals to 768 and B equals to 8
For the 900 KB [47] Camera
N equals to 280, M equals to 20 and B equals to 8
3.2.3 Noise scenarios
Last, the third part included an additional noise node (N). N sends an FTP of 3800KB file
size to K with a fixed interarrival time of 1 sec. This was simulated on all cases. N sends to K
simultaneously while the system is normally operating. The fault free scenario, where the 16
controllers are sending their data to K as well and to KV as a backup. The embedded video
control is also sending its required action to the video actuator. Along with two watchdogs‘
applications are being exchanged. It should be noted that the FTP in this case signifies a constant
form of communication. The FTP is TCP/IP which is a constant data exchange method. It is
considered a noise factor over the system, which is using UDP application to simulate the
packets sent and received from sensors to controllers and from controllers to actuators.
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Figure 3.6 fault free Noisy Model
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Figure 3.7 failure Noisy model
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Figure 3.8 KV failure Noisy Model

3.3 Simulation Results
The system performance is evaluated by measuring the end-to-end delay. This end-to-end
delay should cover all delay types: encapsulation, processing, propagation, queuing and
decapsulation.
Table 3.1 shows the maximum end-to-end delay from sensing node to controller as well
as from controller to actuation node for all scenarios.
Table 3.2 presents the maximum end-to-end delay from sensing node to controller as well
as from controller to actuation nodes for all scenarios, but with the addition of the Noise node.
As for Fig. 3.8, it displays the End-to-End delay of K in the case of fault-free noiseless
Scenario.
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From the below mentioned results, the main controller failure (KF) has the minimum
delay. This is expected since the sensing nodes transmit their data only to the embedded video
controller. While the raw data is not transmitted on the network it is still between the video
sensor and its embedded controller. On the other hand, the embedded controller failure scenarios
showed different results. Regarding the 300 KB camera, it shows a delay that is less than the
fault free scenario. To illustrate, the sensing nodes in this case transmits the data and the raw
video data to the main controller only, the amount of traffic results in a delay that is still less than
Fault Free (FF). Unlike, the raw video data sent by the 768 KB camera and 900 KB camera
which results in network congestion. This congestion causes an increase in the end-to-end delay
to be greater than the FF scenario.
It should be noted that the collision domains are isolated, since the network is switched.
Thus, periodic traffic will cause deterministic end-to-end delays.
Table 3.1 End to End delay for noiseless Scenarios

Scenario

Delay µs

FF

12.72

KF

10.58

KVF_300 camera

11.38

KVF_768 camera

14.14

KVF_900 camera

15.34
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Table 3.2 End to End delay for noise Scenarios

Scenario

Delay µs

FF

614.94

KF

600.56

KVF_300 camera

601.37

KVF_768 camera

604.04

KVF_900 camera

605.26

delay

t
Figure 3.9 Packet End-to-End Delay of K in FF noiseless Scenario
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3.4 Performability Analysis
As explained above, the system can stand one of the two controllers failing, with no
observable decrease in the system‘s performance. As in [25], the number of operational
controllers affects the end-to-end delay.
In order to compute the Transient Performability TP (t), the system reliability model
should be expressed first. The Markov model for the system is shown in the below Fig.3.9, it has
4 states: 3, 2, 1 and 0. State 3 represents the fault-free while state 2 is when K fails, and state 1 is
when KV fails. State 0 indicates the system failure.
Assume

to be the failure rate of the main controller while

is the failure rate of

KV. In this model for simplicity, it is supposed that, for all three cameras, the controllers have
the same failure rate

.

After that, a reward (or a penalty) should be given for each state [48], [18]. In this case,
the reward is defined to be the difference between the sampling period or in other words packet
delivery deadline that is 694µs and the end-to-end delay.
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2

0

3

1

Figure 3.10 Markov Model

The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations shown below are used to calculate the transient
probability of being in any of the 4 states [20].
Let

be the probability of being in any of state i (i= 3, 2, 1, 0) at time t. Given that
and
⁄

(6)

[

[

Substituting P & T in

(7)

]

]

(8)

⁄
(9)
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Taking ln to both sides
(10)
Thus,
(11)
Substituting P & T in

⁄
(12)

(13)

(14)

Integrate both sides
∫

∫

∫

∫

(15)

(16)

∫

(17)

(18)

(19)

Let
(20)
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Therefore,

Thus,
(21)
Substituting P & T in

⁄
(22)

Integrate both sides
∫

(23)

∫

∫

(24)

(

)

(25)

Let
(26)
Then
(27)
Therefore
(28)
(29)
The Transient Performability TP (t) is calculated as follows [15]:
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∑

(30)

Where ψ is the set of the three states in the mentioned model and Rewi is the reward of state i
Table 3.3 shows the Reward which as the difference between the 694µs sampling period
and the end-to-end delay as mentioned before and the same delay values presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Reward for noiseless scenarios

Scenario

Delay µs

Reward µs

FF

12.72

681.28

KF

10.58

683.42

KVF_300
camera

KVF_768
camera

KVF_900
camera

11.38

682.62

14.14

679.86

15.34

678.66

In this case study, it is supposed that the entrenched controller fails 2 times per month
while the main controller fails 1 time per month.

(31)
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(32)

Fig.3.11 displays the Transient Performability for the three cameras: 300KB ,768KB and
900KB over 16 hours when KV fails.

Performability
0.6813
0.6812
0.6811
0.681
0.6809
0.6808
0.6807
0.6806
0.6805
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

TP_300

7

8
TP_768

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16
TP_900

Figure 3.11 Performability for the 300KB, 768 & 900KBs camera for16 hours.

3.5 Summary
Smart sensing nodes in NCS are growing in importance with the emerge of Industry 4.0.
Utilizing smart sensing nodes can propose lots of benefits to the ordinary NCS. Besides, the use
of these smart sensing nodes can be extra achievable specifically due to the use of NCSs that
offer plenty of bandwidth. Since Industry 4.0 is concerned about renovating ordinary factories to
smart and Network Control System is composed of smart sensing nodes, actuation nodes and
controllers. Thus, the use of NCS in automation applications should be of great importance in the
upcoming industrial revolution, Industry 4.0.
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The proposed model is categorized as NCS that can be used in Industry 4.0. The abovementioned model presents an NCS that utilizes switched Ethernet, with smart sensors, smart
actuators and a smart controller. The system includes a smart sensor that processes video data
through an onboard camera and embedded video controller. This chapter studied the effect of the
video sensor on the NCS and presented a fault-tolerant system that shows the use of the sensor‘s
onboard controller as a backup to the system‘s main controller.
All sensing nodes send their samples to all the controllers via the ethernet switch that is
wired to the controller. On the controllers‘ level, Fault tolerance is implemented, and the system
is shown to stand the failure of one of the controllers without a performance degradation that,
and the system is shown to tolerate the failure of either controllers without a performance
degradation that causes violations of packet delivery deadlines. In the incident of one controller
failing, the other functional controller carries the load. The network is shown to tolerate the
failure of one controller as long as the other one is functioning. The remaining functional
controller handles traffic during the failure of the other one. Both controllers must be aware of
the real-time status of each other, in order to guarantee a smooth transition in case of failure.
Both controllers receive the sampled data sent by the sensors simultaneously. The two controllers
exchange a watchdog application to update each other of their status. Hence, at any time, the two
controllers are fully aware of the status of the network. When the embedded video controller
fails, the raw video data is communicated on the network. Three different cameras with different
features were tested.
The model is successfully modeled and tested using Riverbed Network Modeler. Lastly, a
performability analysis is presented on the described model.
A performability analysis of the system was then conducted in which a case study that
simultaneously examines failure data with reward for all of the simulated scenarios was
examined.
In the coming chapter, a modification to the presented system is introduced where an
FPGA is added to the system, to make use of its powerfulness and increase the system‘s
reliability. In addition, a new important feature is added to the system, storage in which video
images are captured and stored.
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Chapter 4
Reliable FPGA-based Camera Sensor for NCS
4.1 Modified model
In the previously explained chapter, the model is composed of 16 sensors, 4 actuators, a
controller. In addition, a camera sensor with an entrenched video controller and its related video
actuation node. The control data is being sent from the 16 sensors to the controller and to the
embedded video controller as a backup in case the controller fails. After that, the controller then
transmits its action to the actuation node. Concurrently, the video data is being transmitted from
the camera sensor to its video actuator via the embedded video controller. Two watchdog signals
were added for Fault Tolerance, the signals are sent at double the sampling rate which is half the
sampling period to guarantee the functionality of the system when one controller fails. Thus,
once any of the controllers fail, the functional controller can conquest its duties before
processing the following packet. Three different scenarios were studied and simulated in the
presence and absence of the noise node using Riverbed Network Modeler.
The difference between the previous model and the suggested one is the installation of an
FPGA chip instead of the video controller. The model still has 16 sensors S1=>S16, a controller
K and 4 actuators A1=> A4. As shown in the below figure, the FPGA consists of two similar
soft-core camera controllers namely: KV1 & KV2. In addition, KV3; it is another soft-core
camera controller that is used for storage. The main task of KV3 is to locally save the video data.
Every now and then, KV3 sends the saved data to the supervisor over the network. There are also
two hardwired ARM processors in the FPGA as in [49]. In this model, the two ARM processors
are considered as one powerful controller, KARM. In error-free scenario, both the sensors send
their data to K and KARM. KARM backs up K and takes over its responsibilities upon its failure.
Since KARM is powerful, it takes over the responsibilities of KV3 if it fails. Therefore, the system
has three watchdogs. First, is between KV1 and KV2 where watchdog packet is being exchanged
between both controllers in order to backup each other upon the failure of any of them. Second,
KV3 transmits a watchdog packet to KARM. Once KV3 fails, KARM will notice this failure and
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take over the duties of KV3. The last watchdog is between KARM & K where KARM can
immediately handle K‘s tasks in case of failure since it already has the data.

KV1

KV2

KV3

ARM

Figure 4.1 FPGA Controllers

Unlike the previous model, the raw video data is not sent over the network. This is
because either KV1 or KV2 will process the data in the FPGA; by this, the volume of data
transferred on the network is less than in the faulty scenario mentioned in chapter 3 when the
camera controller fails and the system will send the raw video data over the network to K. In the
new architecture, the error-free and erroneous scenario are similar to the error-free scenario in
chapter 3, this from the network point of view. Thus, this architecture will also meet control
system restrictions in terms of the end-to-end delay and zero packet loss.
This model can be used in the same application previously suggested in the above
chapter, namely an inspection machine. Though, in this case the video data is saved and
transmitted to the supervisor from time to time.
Industrial environments are susceptible to several radiation sources. These sources are
considered the primary source of errors in SRAM-based FPGAs. As previously explained, Single
Event Effects (SEEs) resulted from radiations caused the existence of transient and permanent
faults according to the amount of energy transferred by the radiation particles [37]. Unlike KARM,
44

KV1, KV2 and KV3 are subjected to both impermanent and permanent failures since they are
FPGA-based. KARM is mainly affected by permanent failures. Single Event Upsets (SEUs) is well
known as the most common type of failure in FPGAs [37]. Permanent failures which destroy the
fabric of the FPGA can occur, depending on the amount energy hitting the FPGA. On the other
hand, impermanent failures can be recovered by using DPR in order to reconfigure the FPGA
with the correct bit streams [50].

4.2 Reliability Modeling
Fig. 4.6 presents the Markov model for the suggested system. In this model, the sequence
of modules is arranged as follows: KV1, K, KARM, KV2 & KV3 respectively. To illustrate, in the
Markov model, a ―0‖ indicates that the module is functioning while a ―1‖ signifies that it has
failed. Therefore, ―00000‖ is the initial state where all the elements are operating. In case of fault
in either K and KARM, the system goes to states ―01000‖ and ―00100‖ respectively since, they are
only affected by permanent failures. Hk and Harm are the notation for the transition rates of K
and KARM respectively. As for the failures of KV1, KV2 and KV3, the case is dissimilar. As,
these 3 controllers are prone to both impermanent as well as permanent failures. An attempt for
recovery is operated and Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) is initiated once a failure is
sensed in any of these controllers [50]. If the failure is impermanent, the error will be
successfully repaired by DPR. Though, if the module still does not operate properly after DPR,
the failure should be permanent, and the controller is removed from the system.

Figure 4.2 An example of system behavior in the case of KV1 failure
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In the presented Markov model shown in the below Fig. 4.6, it is assumed that KV1, KV2
and KV3 have equal failure rates, since the three are all implemented with similar soft-core
processors such as the MicroBlaze. For the given model, assume S to be the rate of impermanent
failures affecting KV1, KV2, or KV3 and H the rate of permanent failures for KV1, KV2, or
KV3. Fig. 4.2 illustrates a section of the Markov model in Fig.4.6 to explain the system behavior
in the case of impermanent or permanent failure of KV1, KV2 or KV3. The figure shows the
transition from the error-free state 00000 to KV1 failure state 10000. Upon an error, the system
moves to state ―rec‖ at a rate of S+H. At ―rec‖ state, DPR is performed on the location of KV1 in
the FPGA. Now comes the decision, if the error is impermanent, KV1 continues its correct
operation and the system transitions back to the error free state 00000 at a rate of Z×μ. On the
other hand, if the failure is permanent, the system transitions to the error state 10000 at a rate of
(1-Z) ×μ. It should be noted that the mean time needed to complete DPR in the location of KV1
is (1/μ) and ―Z‖ is the conditional probability in which a failure is impermanent given that a
failure has happened. The same approach is used with the rest of the model.
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Figure 4.3 Transitions from state "00000"

According to the previously explained approach the transition in the Markov model goes
as follows. Starting from state ―00000‖, a failure can occur in any of the 5 controllers. If the
failure happens at KV2, then the next state becomes ―rec1‖ at which the type of failure is
determined whether temporary or permanent. If the failure in KV2 is temporary, then the node
recovers and goes back to the previous state, in this case the starting state ―00000‖. Else if the
failure is permanent, then KV2 is now out of service and noted as ―1‖. Back to the initial state
―00000‖, if a failure occurs in KV3, the next state becomes ―rec‖ in which also the type of failure
is determined and the node status is set accordingly to ―0‖ upon recovery from temporary failure
or ―1‖ if it‘s a permanent failure. The case where KV1 has failed was previously explained and
presented in Fig. 4.2 transitioning from ―00000‖ to ―01000‖ indicates the failure of the main
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controller K while moving to state ―00100‖ means that a failure has occurred in KARM. Fig.4.3
summarizes the explained transitions.

Figure 4.4 Transitions from state "10000"

Now, moving to the second stage in the Markov model where an error has occurred in
one of the controllers. To illustrate, there are four probabilities when transitioning from state
―10000‖ where KV1 has permanently failed. First, the failure of K indicated as ―11000‖; in this
case the system is still functioning since KARM will take over K‘s function and KV2 is already
replacing KV1.Second, the failure of KARM and being in state ―10100‖ where the system is
correctly working, but with K taking over KARM and KV2 taking over KV1. Third, the failure of
KV3 and then moving to ―rec9‖ in order to identify the type of failure. As previously explained,
if the failure is permanent, then KARM will take over KV3‘s function and the system will still
work properly. On the other hand, if the failure is temporary, the next stage will be back to
―10000‖. Last but not least, if KV2 permanently fails going to ―10010‖, then the system stops
since this is one of the down states where both video controllers have failed. This explained
concept for stage 2 to apply to all states ―01000‖, ―00100‖, ―00010‖ and ―00001‖.
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Figure 4.5 Transitions from state "01010"

As for stage 3, where two controllers have failed, there are three probabilities for each
state. For example, there are three possible scenarios when moving from stage ―01010‖ where
both K and KV2 have failed. To start with, the failure of KV3 and being in the recovery state to
check the type of failure. If KV3 permanently fails, the next state is ―01011‖ and the system will
still work properly, as KARM will take over. On the other hand, once KARM fails the system will
move to one of the down states ―01110‖ and will stop working. The same thing happens upon the
failure of KV1, the next state will be ―11010‖ which is also one of the down states. The same
approach is taken in the rest of stage 3 states.
Moving to the last stage in the Markov model where three controllers have failed, but the
system is still functioning as in states ―01011‖ and ―11001‖. This because in state‖01011‖, KV1
is taking over KV2 and KARM is taking over both KV3 & K. Same concept applies to ―11001‖,
where KV2is taking over KV1 and KARM is taking over both KV3 & K.
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The system reliability can be obtained by solving the Markov model. The system has 58
states. Let

(t) be the probability of being in state i at time t. Using the Chapman-Kolmogorov

equations, the transient probability of residing in any of the i states can be calculated [20]:
(33)
where
(34)

(35)

T=

(36)
[

]

The probabilities of each state i is included in the matrix P while T is the Transition Rate
Matrix. Assume the probability of

(0) is 1 while all other states have an initial probability

of 0. By substituting T and P in equation (1), the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be solved.
Besides,

(t) for each state i can be calculated. Consequently, system reliability R(t) at time t

can be calculated by summing the probabilities of not being in any of the ―down‖ states at time t.
It should be noted that this is where there is a complete system failure. When both KV1 and KV2
fail or both KARM and KV3 fail or both K and KARM fail, the system should fail. The below table
4.1 shows the down states.
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Table 4.1 Down States

Let

Down States

Failed controllers

10010

KV1 & KV2

00101

KARM &KV3

01100

K & KARM

00111

KARM, KV2 & KV3

01110

K, KARM & KV2

01101

K, KARM & KV3

11010

KV1, K & KV2

11100

KV1, K & KARM

10101

KV1, KARM &KV3

10011

KV1, KV2 & KV3

11011

KV1, K, KV2 & KV3

01111

K, KARM, KV2 & KV3

10110

KV1, KARM & KV2

(t) be the probability of being in any of the down states. Hence,

(37)
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Figure 4.6 Markov Model on SHARPE
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4.3 Case Study
In this section, a comparison case study between the recently presented system and the
previous system is presented. An answer for which system gives better reliability is given.

It is important to note that one of the advantages of the proposed system is the storage
function where KV3 saves the images and sends them to the supervisor every now and then. In
addition to the mentioned advantage, the raw data is NEVER sent on the network once the video
controller fails unlike the previous system. The reason for this is that the two video controllers,
KV1 & KV2, are considered a 1-out-of-2 fault-tolerant system in the FPGA.

The previous system was a simple 1-out-of-2 system where the embedded video
controller would back up the main controller upon its failure and vice versa. For reasonable
comparison, the same failure rates used in section 3.4 is used in this case study.

The failure rate for the main controller was 1 per month; thus, Hk is equal to 1 per month
that is 0.25 per week. As for the video controller, the failure rate in the previous system was 2
per month. Similarly, the failure rate of the FPGA will be 2 per month that is 0.5 per week. It
should be highlighted that these failure rates consider the harsh industrial environment.

According to the layout of the Xilinx Zynq device in the Xilinx Vivado tool, it is shown
that the area consumed by the two ARM processors is less than the area of the FPGA. As a
result, assume the following:
(38)
As previously mentioned, KV1, KV2 & KV3 are implemented by 3 similar softcore
MicroBlaze. Reference to [52], the Single Event Upsets (SEUs) per bit rate was 2.17×10-9 /week.
Supposed that the size of the MicroBlaze processor is 2036 KB, S=0.036/week. This rate applies
to the three softcore processors. Reference to the information in [53] for the 3 softcore
MicroBlaze processors assume that failure rate H is 250 times higher than the rate of SEUs
which is equivalent to 0.000144/week.
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(39)
As for the repair rate μ, it depends on the time taken to perform DPR [50] on a
MicroBlaze processor. In this case and following the information in [38], the repair rate

is

equal to the following:

(40)

The below Table 4.2 shows a comparison between the reliabilities of the proposed system
with the FPGA and the previous system. In addition, it compares the mentioned systems to the
non-fault tolerant scenario of the previously mentioned model in Chapter 3 namely, R_simplex.
The results were obtained using SHARPE package [51]. As shown in the results, the reliability
of the presented system is better than the previous one although the existence of the new
function, storage.

Table 4.2 Comparison Between R_modified , R_previous & R_simplex

Time (weeks)

(%)

(%)

(%)

1

96.914995

91.296489

47.23665527

2

89.790849

75.127994

22.31301601

3

80.862007

59.009749

10.53992246

4

71.456369

45.342766

4.978706837

5

62.327648

34.507205

2.351774586

6

53.871324

26.180823

1.110899654
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4.4 Summary
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) is considered a motivating architecture for industrial
applications. NCSs are composed of three main types of nodes: smart sensors, actuators and
controllers. In addition, FPGAs have recently been increasingly used in industry. Dynamic
Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) is an important feature in FPGAs that is one of the main
advantages to use it, as it repairs some failures without disturbing system operation.

The

proposed modified model joint both NCSs and FPGAs in a new architecture that has numerous
compensations. First, video saving ability is included that is crucial in some applications.
Second, the model has various fault-tolerant features to extend system lifetime. Third, the raw
video data is not transmitted over the network even in the case of failure. At last, a case study is
presented to asses and measures the increase in reliability of the proposed model. Markov
models were established and using SHARPE package the reliability of the presented system is
compared with the system presented in chapter 3; the results show that the presented model is
more reliable.
The modified proposed system used FPGAs since; they are one of the most powerful
chips for high performance in industrial systems. It combines both NCS system with an FPGA
instead of the Video Controller proposed in the previous model. The new system added storage
feature where the images now can be stored. From time to time the stored data can be sent to the
supervisor. Also, the stored data can be retrieved whenever it's essential. The use of FPGAs
decreased the amount of traffic on the network once the video controller fails when compared to
the previous model. Besides, there are two video controllers in the FPGA that backup each other
in case of faults.
For reasonable Reliability analysis and fair comparison Markov models were presented &
studied for both systems. This was simulated through SHARPE package to obtain system
reliability and it was concluded that the proposed system showed improved reliability results
although the proposed system had an added feature, storage. An example to demonstrate the
results, after the 3rd week of operation, it was shown that the reliability of the previous system
was 45% while the proposed system reliability was 71%.
In chapter 5, the thesis is concluded and some recommended future work will be discussed
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommended Future Work
Nowadays, Networked Control Systems play an important role in different fields and lots of
industrial applications. The use of smart nodes: actuators, sensors & controllers offers lots of
advantages in comparison to the traditional networks. At the same time, Industry 4.0 is
concerned with transforming traditional factories to smart factories. Hence, deploying smart
NCS in factories is part of Industry 4.0. Using FPGAs in NCS is also beneficial and important.
Since they are powerful integrated circuits that can be used to apply any digital circuit to serve
various applications in different fields. One of these fields is the industrial control. FPGAs are
considered as protection of investment since updates or changes can be easily programmed and
configured without the need of doing major changes in the system.
In this research, NCS that is composed of 16 sensors, controller and 4 actuators along
with a video sensor with an embedded controller and their video actuator are modeled using
Riverbed. Fault tolerance was added to the model at the controller level. Two watchdog
applications are exchanged between the two controllers, so once any of the controller fails, the
other takes over since it acts like a backup to the node. The system proved that it can tolerate the
failure of one of the controllers. The simulations showed that the model was able to meet the
system‘s requirements with zero packet loss. Several scenarios were simulated. First, was the
fault free scenario where all nodes are working correctly. After that a faulty scenario was tested
were the main controller has failed. Then, the scenario where the embedded video controller has
failed was simulated, with three different values for the camera: 300, 768 & 900 KB
respectively. All the mentioned scenarios were tested in both the presence and absence of noise.
As expected, the main controller‘s failure scenario resulted in the least delay, since the raw video
data isn‘t sent on the network as in the failure of the embedded controller and the data isn‘t
duplicated when compared to the fault free scenario. The 300 KB video data when the embedded
video controller failure resulted in a less delay in comparison to the FF. This is because the
transmitted data is less than that of the FF unlike the 768 & 900 KB scenarios which congest the
network. Last but not least, a performability analysis was then presented and a case study is
56

studied that concurrently inspects failure data with reward for all simulation scenarios. The
modeled network uses switched Ethernet.
A modification for the presented model was then studied in which an FPGA was used
instead of the camera controller. The FPGA consists of two hardwired ARM processors that acts
as one powerful processor, KARM, and two similar soft-core camera controllers, KV1 & KV2,
besides, an extra soft-core controller, KV3 that is used for storage. The new model provides two
important features. First, storage which was absent in the previous model and is important in
some applications. The other feature is that the raw data is never transferred on the network
unlike the previous model. An important advantage is that the KV1 and KV2 back up with an
identical controller. Also, KARM backs up KV3 and vice versa. Besides, the main controller K and
KARM back up each other.
For fair comparison, a reliability analysis for both systems was presented. Markov
models were developed and simulated using SHARPE. The results showed better reliability
results for the modified system in comparison to the other one even though the modified had an
additional function. For instance, by the third week of operation, the reliability of the previous
system decreased to 45% unlike the reliability of proposed system that was still 71%.
In conclusion, the models presented in the research can be utilized in several applications
one of which is the inspection machine. The main controller would be responsible for the
movement of the conveyer belt while the video sensor would sense the item/product that should
be inspected, process the video data and take action accordingly through the embedded
controller. On the other hand, in the modified model, the video data is being stored and sent to
the supervisor every now and then for reference. The conveyer belt should always be working.
However, the system can tolerate controllers failing, without completely stopping the production
line. The system also guarantees the fail secure.
The recommended future work to this research would be the following. Modeling the
modified system on an FPGA and testing its performance, hence making a prototype for the
model. Another suggestion would be using higher video quality and monitoring the delay and
system‘s requirements. Expanding the network by adding another identical cell to the introduced
system and connect it with the previous one, by this the number of nodes would double, different

57

fault tolerance techniques at the controllers. After this, reliability analysis can be studied and the
performance can be evaluated accordingly.
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